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Ben Rissing

Cornell University, ILR

Government Mandates, Manager Anticipatory Compliance, and a Partisan Filter in Enforcement Expectation

Date: Friday October 24, 2025
Time:10:30 AM -12:00 PM
Location: Armstrong 155A

All are cordially invited to attend.

Abstract:

Government mandates (e.g., laws, executive orders) are often initially change-prone and subject to legal contestation. Yet, some managers promptly comply despite uncertainty regarding mandate legality and scope. Less is known about the drivers of managers鈥� anticipatory compliance decisions. Studying this, we examine U.S. President Trump鈥檚 2017 鈥淢uslim ban鈥� executive order, which sought to ban U.S. entry for immigrants from seven majority-Muslim countries. Leveraging government administrative records on employer-sponsored immigrant work authorization applications, we analyze managers鈥� response to the ban through anticipatory compliance (voluntary application withdrawal). Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find withdrawal rates increased from 0.3 to 8.5 percent for immigrants from targeted majority Muslim countries in the year after the ban, relative to the year before, peaking at 29 percent. We find that this withdrawal increase is not driven by broad anti-Muslim bias, or a partisan imperative to demonstrate timely responsiveness. Rather, analyses indicate the presence of a partisan filter in enforcement expectation: Manager withdrawals from Republican-leaning employers increased gradually and peaked with the U.S. Supreme Court鈥檚 announced willingness to consider the Muslim Ban鈥檚 legality, which occurred in the 5-6 months after the Muslim Ban executive order. Findings emphasize the capacity of government to shape labor market dynamics through (even legally-contested) mandates, and the importance of accounting for employer ideology in anticipatory compliance decisions.